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ABSTRACT
Low levels of political trust are associated with a preference for protest parties. Some authors
have argued that protest parties in this manner indirectly contribute to the stability of electoral
democracy, functioning as ‘safety valve’ for political discontent. In this paper, we investigate
the relation between protest voting and political trust in a dynamic perspective, relying on a
five year long Belgian panel study. We confirm that citizens with low levels of political trust
are more likely to vote for protest parties. Additionally, we point out that decreasing levels of
trust significantly increase the probability of voting for a protest party, even controlling for
absolute levels of trust. Most importantly, having voted for a protest party in 2009 explains a
subsequent further drop in political trust during the 2009-2014 observation period. The panel
analysis suggests that distrust and protest voting reinforce one another, leading to a potential
spiral of distrust.
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 1. INTRODUCTION
The  literature  on  the  relation  between  political  trust  and  electoral  behaviour  shows  that
dissatisfied  voters  are  more  likely  to  abstain  from  voting  (Bélanger  &  Nadeau,  2005;
Hetherington, 1999; Gabriel, 2015). In a context of compulsory voting, however, abstaining is
not a valid option and in that case blank and invalid voting are strongly related to low levels
of political trust (Hooghe, Marien & Pauwels, 2011). Furthermore, previous research offers
convincing evidence that some parties succeed in attracting the ‘disgruntled’ voters (Van der
Brug, 2003). By voting for third parties, protest parties, extremist or populist parties, citizens
have a possibility to voice their discontent (Miller & Listhaug, 1990).
The relation between distrust and protest voting has been well established. Van der Brug and
Fennema (2003: 58) define protest voting as “a vote primarily cast to scare the elite that is
not  policy  driven”.  Accordingly,  a  party  preference  that  is  mainly  driven  by  distrust  in
political institutions qualifies as a protest vote. In the literature, there is more disagreement
about the long-term consequences of this form of protest voting. While most of the previous
studies have investigated the relation between political (dis)trust and voting behaviour in a
cross-sectional manner, the purpose of the current study is to investigate the dynamic relation
between trust  and voting.  If  a  protest  party succeeds in  gaining appeal,  this  might  partly
restore a citizen’s faith in the electoral process. In that case, voting for an anti-establishment
party might have a positive effect on democratic legitimacy as this vote functions as a kind of
safety valve to stabilize levels of discontent. However, a number of scholars have also argued
that  voting  behaviour  might  fuel  discontent,  and  spread  negative  feelings  across  the
population (Rooduijn, de Lange & Van der Brug, 2014).
With respect to the relation between protest voting and distrust, different expectations emerge
from the literature. A first expectation is that protest parties merely benefit from pre-existing
attitudes  of  dissatisfaction  and  register  the  attitudes  that  are  already  present.  A second
expectation is that protest and populist parties not only mobilize dissatisfied voters but that
they also fuel a sense of dissatisfaction in the electorate (Van der Brug, 2003). Third, it has
been argued that particular protest parties succeed in channelling dissatisfaction and stop an
over-time decline of political trust (Miller & Listhaug, 1990). The cross-sectional data that
have  previously  been  used  to  shed  light  on  this  question  allow  speculating  about  the
directionality of this link, but panel data are needed for drawing strong inferences. 
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In this paper, we investigate the dynamic relation between political trust and voting behaviour
by means of a panel design. This allows studying how the trust level of protest voters evolves
following their vote decision. We make use of the data from the Belgian Election Panel (2009-
2014), in which a representative sample of voters has been surveyed in the context of both the
2009 and the 2014 Belgian elections. Previous research has already shown a strong relation
between political trust and voting for populist and extreme-right parties in Belgium (Hooghe
et al., 2011), rendering the Belgian context an interesting case for investigating this research
puzzle on dynamic patterns as well. Furthermore, the general decline of trust in Belgium, as a
result of long political crisis (Hooghe, 2012) introduces considerable variation in our data
during the observation period. 
The Belgian context consists of two separate party systems; one of Dutch-language parties
and  one  of  French-language  parties.  As  protest  parties  are  mainly  present  in  the  Dutch
language area of the country (Deschouwer et al., 2015), we expect protest voting to be present
mainly in the Dutch language region of Flanders, while we expect a more diffuse pattern
among Francophone voters. If voting has a subsequent effect on political trust,  this effect
therefore  should be limited  to  the Flemish  region,  and be absent  in  the French language
region.
We first review the literature on the relation between political trust and voting behaviour with
specific attention for the discussion on how attitudes not only affect vote choices, but how
vote  choices  can  affect  attitudes  as  well.  We provide  more  information  on  the  Belgian
electoral context, before presenting data and methods. After discussing the results from our
analyses we add some remarks on the implications of our findings for the role of protest
voting in electoral democracy.
2. POLITICAL TRUST AND VOTE CHOICES
It is by now readily accepted in the literature that levels of political trust affect voters’ party
preferences. The first studies on this topic originated in the context of two-party systems and
highlighted  that  low levels  of  political  trust  might  be  beneficial  for  the  opposition  party
(Citrin,  1974).  When more than two candidates  or parties  compete for election,  however,
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dynamics are different. Hetherington (1999) has shown that if there is a viable third party, this
party attracts the distrusting – breaking the dominance of the two major parties in the United
States. Similarly, political distrust  has been found to be an important determinant of third
party voting in the Canadian context (Bélanger & Nadeau, 2005). According to Miller and
Listhaug (1990), how the distrusting citizen votes depends on how flexible the party system
is. If a party system is sufficiently open, protest parties can rise and attract votes among the
low trusting. In their view, this form of responsiveness could subsequently have a positive
effect on the level of legitimacy of electoral politics because the disgruntled find an effective
instrument to voice their discontent.
The relation between distrust and protest voting has also been investigated in the literature
that establishes at an individual level the link between the aggregate level trends of an alleged
decline of political trust on the one hand (Hetherington, 1998; Norris, 1999) and a surge of
populist  and  protest  parties  across  Western  democracies  on  the  other  (Arzheimer,  2009;
Mudde, 2007; van Kessel, 2011). Attitudes of dissatisfaction and political distrust are indeed a
recurrent theme in research analysing the determinants of choosing protest or populist parties.
A prime example is the Netherlands, where voting for the populist party List Pim Fortuyn
clearly was an expression of anti-partyism, political cynicism, low levels of political efficacy
and political distrust (Bélanger & Aarts, 2006; Schumacher & Rooduijn, 2013; Van der Brug,
2003). Even though all these authors stress the relevance of policy positions and leader effects
in voting for populist parties (either on the left or on the right), it is clear that a vote for one of
these parties is to some extent a protest vote (Ivarsflaten, 2007). Our first hypothesis is thus
that there will be a relation between distrust and protest voting:
H1: There  is  a  negative  relation  between  levels  of  political  trust  in  2014,  and  the
probability of voting for protest parties.
The impact of political trust on voting behaviour is generally investigated in a static way, i.e.,
the effect of levels of trust on vote choices are looked at. A case could be made, however, for
taking into account changes in trust levels. A first reason to think so is that voters can vote in a
directional  manner (Rabinowitz & Macdonald,  1989). For political trust,  what matters for
their vote choice would then not be the overall level of trust, but how the assessment of the
political system has changed over time. If voters have become less trusting in politics, the
direction of how their attitudes changed would lead them to choose a party mobilizing on
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distrust. Second, research in the field of economic voting shows that voters act retrospectively
and take into account  past  performances of the incumbent  (Fiorina,  1978; Lewis-Beck &
Stegmaier, 2013). With respect to political trust as well, voters could be retrospective and be
guided by their assessment of change over an electoral cycle. Our second hypothesis therefore
reads that change in political trust, rather than the absolute level of trust, would be associated
with protest voting.
H2: An overtime decline in political trust, is positively related to the probability of voting
for protest parties, even controlling for absolute levels of political trust.
Most research on the relation between political trust and voting for protest parties is based on
single or repeated cross-sectional studies. Such designs provide evidence on the presence of a
relation  between  political  trust  and  voting  behaviour,  but  they  do  not  shed  light  on
directionality. In terms of the role of political parties themselves, three different perspectives
can be distinguished. First, protest parties could merely attract dissatisfied voters and offer an
option for representation for the low trusting voters present in the electorate (Bélanger &
Aarts, 2006). As such, we would not expect any effect of protest voting on the subsequent
development of political trust. Second, protest parties can – by channelling feelings of distrust
within  the  electoral  system  –  reduce  political  discontent,  as  pointed  out  by  Miller  and
Listhaug (1990). From a comparative analysis of the impact of trust and efficacy on voting
behaviour in the United States, Sweden and Norway, they concluded that  “in the flexible
multi-party  system  of  Norway,  distrust  was  channelled  back  into  the  electoral  arena  as
support for the opposition and protest parties of the right” (Miller & Listhaug, 1990: 382-
383).  The theoretical relevance of this claim is that protest voting can be considered as a
‘healthy’ sign for the vitality of electoral politics. If citizens can express their distrust in the
voting booth,  this  might restore their  faith in  the electoral process.  If  the protest  party is
successful,  it  might  even moderate  its  party program and join a  new governing coalition
(Dandoy, 2014). A third, and opposite claim is that protest parties can act to ‘fuel’ political
discontent.  From his  study of  determinants  of  voting  for  List  Pim Fortuyn  (LPF)  in  the
Netherlands Van der Brug (2003) concludes that  a preference for LPF aroused discontent
rather than being driven by it. Bélanger and Aarts (2006: 16), however, make use of panel-
data and disagree with this point of view. Their analyses lead them to stress that a ‘reservoir of
discontent’ already existed in the Netherlands, where the LPF successfully tapped into. Still,
they as well find LPF supporters to become more cynical over time.  For the Belgian case,
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using panel data Thijssen (2001) has shown that voting for the extreme-right in Flanders is
associated with a growing sense of political alienation. The causal mechanism for this effect
might be that once one has voted for a specific party, this behaviour affects a voter’s attitudes
and is incorporated into the political identity of the voter (Boonen & Hooghe, 2014; Dinas,
2014). As Dinas (2014) has shown with regard to the development of party identification,
voters’  attitudes  can  change  to  match  more  closely  their  previous  voting  behaviour.
Mechanisms of cognitive dissonance and self-perception help us explain why voters – perhaps
unconsciously – change their attitudes and bring them in line with the attitudinal pattern that
is associated with a specific political party (Dinas, 2014).  This kind of causal logic is well
grounded in the  social  psychological  literature.  Cognitive  dissonance  theory, but  also  the
research tradition on minimal group effects assumes that actors have a tendency to adapt their
attitudes  to  their  assigned or  selected  group identity. Self-perception  theory assumes  that
actors actively interpret their own behaviour, and develop attitudes and preferences that are
compatible with their behaviour. Selection and adaptation mechanisms, finally, part from the
notion that individuals might self-select into a group identity or an interaction context, but
later on adapt to the prevailing value pattern within that group. So there are various social
psychological traditions that argue in favour of investigating the relation from behaviour to
attitudes.  Applying  these  insights  to  having  voted  for  a  protest  party  would  mean  that
subsequently  levels  of  dissatisfaction  become  more  salient,  as  this  offers  a  stronger
congruence  between  one’s  own  attitudes  and  the  attitudinal  pattern  associated  with  this
specific party. Following this logic, we hypothesize that in the Belgian context protest parties
not only mobilize distrust, but additionally fuel distrust among their voters.
H3: Citizens who voted for a protest party will subsequently become more distrusting over
time than those who did not vote for protest parties.
In sum, while it is an established fact that political distrust is associated with voting for protest
parties, questions remain on the evolution of trust over time and how this is related to voting
behaviour. We address this research puzzle, because it is highly relevant for the general debate
about the effects  of protest and populist parties on the stability of electoral democracy in
Europe.
We investigate this relation in Belgium, as this country offers an ideal setting, both for the
study of political trust as for the study on protest voting. Because of a system of compulsory
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voting, abstaining from voting is not a valid exit option, and therefore it can be expected that
low levels of political trust are strongly linked to voting for populist parties. In the context of
the 2009 regional elections in the Flemish region, distrusting citizens were found to have a
higher probability of voting for the populist List Dedecker (LDD), the extreme right Vlaams
Belang (VB) or the Flemish nationalist party (N-VA). If we follow the definition of Van der
Brug and Fennema (2003),  the significant  role  of  political  distrust  as  a  vote  determinant
would qualify these parties as protest parties. It seems, therefore, that a number of parties in
the  Flemish  party  system  succeeded  in  “providing  the  disaffected  with  a  means  of
representation”  (Miller & Listhaug, 1990: 357). It has to be noted that all these parties are
active in the Dutch language party system, while in the French language party system no
effects of political trust could be documented (Hooghe et al., 2011; Pauwels, 2011). This by
itself renders Belgium an interesting case for a comparison between a system with protest
parties (i.e., the Dutch language party system) and a system without protest parties (i.e., the
French language party system). If protest parties indeed “fuel” discontent, as Van der Brug
(2003) has argued, this effect should be present only in the Dutch language region (Dandoy,
2014).
The standard definition of a protest vote is a vote for a party that fundamentally challenges the
established status quo of the political system (McAllister, 1982). Given the ongoing debate
about  what  party  exactly  should  be  considered  as  a  protest  party,  we  opt  for  a  broad
comparison by investigating the vote motives for all parties (Van der Brug, Fennema & Tillie,
2000; Van Spanje, 2011) and analyse the relation between political trust and each political
party. For the Flemish region,  we build further  on previous  research that  has  shown that
protest voting in this party system is clearly discernible  (Hooghe et al., 2011). For the 2014
elections, we assume to find the same voting patterns as observed for the 2009 elections and
expect higher levels of political trust to decrease the probability of voting Vlaams Belang or
N-VA.1 Interestingly, the nationalist party N-VA was considered to be the great winner of the
2009 elections, gaining 13.1 per cent of the vote. The party subsequently entered the Flemish
regional  government,  and  in  the  Belgian  federal  system  this  is  a  very  important  power
position. The nationalists thus quickly made the transition from an anti-establishment party to
a  governing  party,  and  it  remains  to  be  investigated  how  their  voters  reacted  to  this
1. List Dedecker (LDD), that obtained 7.6% of the votes in the 2009 regional elections, only 
ran in one electoral district in 2014 and is therefore not taken into account in the analyses 
predicting respondents’ 2014 vote intention. 
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transformation: did they continue to develop a distrusting attitude, or did the entry of their
preferred party reconcile them with the functioning of the political system in the country?
Because the regional level in Belgium has extensive authorities, we could assume that most
voters will be familiar with the distinction between the federal and the regional level and will
be knowledgeable of the fact that the N-VA was in government at the regional level. In fact,
research on media attention for members of Parliament in Belgium shows that the regional
and federal parliaments receive almost equal attention in television news broadcasts (Hooghe,
Jacobs & Claes, 2015). For the French language party system, by contrast, given that there is
not a clear protest party participating in the elections, we do not have a strong hypothesis on
how political trust affects voting behaviour.
3.DATA AND METHODS
As we aim to shed light on the dynamic relation between political trust and protest voting, we
should have access to data about the evolution over time. Therefore, we rely on data with a
panel structure for our analyses. We employ the data from the Belgian Election Panel (BEP,
2009-2014), a representative survey of voters in the two main regions of Belgium (Flanders
and Wallonia), based on a sample from the National Register of the citizens of Belgium. The
2009 part of the panel survey consisted of three survey waves, two of which were before the
2009 regional elections of 7 June 2009 and one that was in the field shortly after.2 1,698
respondents  took part  in  this  post-electoral  survey wave and were  interviewed by phone,
which is 35% of the original sample (PartiRep 2009). In the run-up to the elections of 25 May
2014, these respondents were contacted again to participate in the 2014 part  of the panel
study. A total of 792 respondents who took part in the 2009 wave 3-survey sent back a paper
questionnaire, which is 46.7% of the population of interest (Dassonneville, Falk Pedersen,
Grieb & Hooghe, 2014).  The data  thus suffer from attrition,  and as this  is  not a  random
phenomenon it likely biases our results (Frankel & Hillygus, 2014; Vandecasteele & Debels,
2007). We partly account for attrition effects by weighting our data by socio-demographic
characteristics. Even though the panel-data are not perfect, for the purpose of our analyses
they are to be preferred over cross-sectional surveys – as recall questions on the previous vote
are known to result in large errors (van der Eijk & Niemöller, 2008).
2. Post-electoral interviews took place between the end of June 2009 and the end of August 
2009.
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As a measure for political trust, we use respondents’ indicated level of trust in the following
institutions; political  parties,  the regional government,  the regional parliament,  the federal
government, the federal parliament and politicians. For each of these institutions, respondents
reported their level of trust on a scale from 0 (no trust at all) tot 10 (complete trust). As clear
from the results in Table 1, for Flemish and Walloon panel-respondents, both in 2009 as well
as in 2014 these six items load solidly on a one-dimensional scale, which is in line with earlier
research (Hooghe et al., 2011; Marien, 2011).3 The mean values for political trust in Table 1
additionally point out a decline in political trust between 2009 and 2014. This decline, from
an average of 5.36 in 2009 to 4.84 in 2014 in the Flemish region and from 5.05 to 4.01 in
Wallonia, is observable for every item included, but is especially pronounced for the regional
institutions. Even though this is a marked decline, it is unsurprising, given the major political
crisis the country went through between 2007 and 2012 (Hooghe, 2012). Other studies too,
suggest  that  this  long lasting governmental  crisis  had a  negative impact  on political  trust
levels in Belgium (Deschouwer et al., 2015). In terms of the differences between both regions,
we observe that levels of political trust are somewhat lower in the Walloon region than in the
Flemish region and the decrease of political trust over the 2009-2014 electoral cycle is more
pronounced  among  Walloon  respondents  as  well  (-1.04,  compared  to  -0.53  for  Flemish
respondents). 
Although the scale is by itself one-dimensional and as such will be used in the analysis, for
some analyses we will also use a distinction between federal and regional institutions. For
these subscales only two items in each case could be used, referring to the regional or federal
parliament and government respectively. The reasons for making this distinction is that the N-
VA in 2009 entered the regional government but not the federal government after the 2010
elections  (Deschouwer & Reuchamps,  2013).  It  could be expected that  dissatisfied N-VA
voters after 2009 would develop higher levels of trust in the regional institutions, while they
would continue to lose trust in the federal institutions of Belgium.
3. The one-dimensionality is stronger in 2014 than in 2009, with an Eigen value rising from 
3.8 to 4.7 in Flanders and from 4.4 to 5.0 in Wallonia and Cronbach’s α rising from .88 to .95 
in the Flemish region and from 0.73 to 0.83 in Wallonia.
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Table 1. Measuring political trust 
Flemish region Walloon region
2009 
(0-10)
2014 
(0-10)
Trend 
2009-14
2009 
(0-10)
2014 
(0-10)
Trend
2009-14
Political parties 4.73 4.31   -0.42*** 4.39 3.64 -0.93***
Regional government 6.28 5.30    -0.98*** 5.28 3.94 -1.35***
Regional parliament 6.09 5.27    -0.82*** 5.07 3.97 -1.10***
Belgian government 5.09 4.84 -0.25* 5.41 4.47 -0.94***
Belgian parliament 5.06 4.84 -0.22* 5.41 4.46 -0.95***
Politicians 4.71 4.24     -0.47*** 4.73 3.79 -0.95***
Average 5.33 4.80      -0.53**** 5.05 4.01 -1.04***
Cronbach’s α 0.88 0.95 0.93 0.96
Eigenvalue 3.78 4.73 4.40 4.97
Explained variance 62.97% 78.88% 0.73% 0.83%
Source:  Belgian Election Panel 2009-2014, N Flemish region =500 and N Walloon region = 364. Entries are
average scores on a 0-10 scale. Significance: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
Our first two hypotheses deal with how trust affects voters’ electoral choices. Investigating the
vote  choice  implies  that  our  dependent  variable  has  a  categorical  nature,  distinguishing
between different vote choice options in the 2014 elections. Therefore, we present the results
of a series of multinomial logistic regression models and we examine voting in the two party
systems separately. For the Flemish region we take a vote for the Christian Democratic party
CD&V as the reference category. We do so, because this is the major mainstream party. The
other  outcome  options  are  a  vote  for  the  green  party  (Groen!),  a  vote  for  the  Flemish
nationalist  party (N-VA),  a  vote  for  the liberal  party (Open VLD),  a  vote for  the social-
democrats (SP.a), a vote for the extreme-right party (Vlaams Belang), a vote for another party
and a blank or invalid vote. Similarly, for the French language parties, we take a vote for the
Christian Democrats (cdH) as a reference category. In the Walloon region, the other options
are a vote for the green party (Ecolo), the liberals (MR), the socialists (PS), the extreme left
party (PTB Go!), a vote for another small party and casting a blank or invalid vote. 
We investigate the impact of political trust on vote choices while controlling for a number of
socio-demographic control variables. We control for respondents’ gender, age and level of
education – distinguishing between low levels of education (with no or less than a high school
degree), middle levels (with only a high school degree) and high levels of education (with a
higher education degree). We additionally control for respondents’ level of political interest
and their self-placement on an ideological left-right scale (both measured on a 0-10-scale).
10
We also investigate how attitudes of political trust evolve after voting for a populist or protest
party. To test our third hypothesis, we first descriptively analyse the evolution of levels of
political trust for voters of different parties. Subsequently, we perform a multivariate analysis
explaining the impact of the vote choice in 2009 on levels of political trust in 2014, while
controlling for the 2009 level of political trust. For doing so, we run an OLS regression, in
which we control for the same set of socio-demographic characteristics as included in the vote
choice model as well. 
4.RESULTS
Before investigating the over-time effects of political trust and voting for protest parties, we
assess whether in the Flemish region – as was the case in 2009 (Hooghe et al., 2011) – levels
of political trust are strongly correlated to preferring particular parties in 2014. For the French
language party system, we expect that – as in 2009 – there is no clear pattern of distrusting
voters choosing specific parties. We control for the effect of gender, age, levels of education,
political interest and left-right self-placement. The full results of this multinomial regression
analysis for the Flemish region are included in Appendix 1 and suggest that political trust is
indeed significantly related to respondents’ party preferences. Higher levels of political trust
significantly decrease the probability of intending to vote for the liberal party Open VLD, the
Flemish  nationalist  party  N-VA,  the  extreme-right  Vlaams  Belang,  another  party  and
intending to  cast  a  blank or invalid  vote compared to intending to  vote for  the Christian
Democrats. 
As the coefficients  obtained from a multinomial  logit  model  are  relative to  the reference
category and hence hard to interpret, in Figure 1 we present the average adjusted predictions
of intending to vote for each of the parties by different levels of political trust. The results are
in line with what was observed in 2009. Low levels of political  trust  are associated with
higher probabilities of voting N-VA, Vlaams Belang or casting a blank or invalid vote. The
results offer support for our first hypothesis, as lower levels of political trust are associated
with higher probabilities of voting for protest parties. Even though the Flemish-nationalist
party N-VA is not generally characterized as a protest party (Hooghe et al., 2011; Boonen &
Hooghe, 2014), the impact of distrust is strongest for this party. For the other parties, there is
hardly any impact of political trust at all, with the notable exception of CD&V. A higher level
of political trust strongly and significantly increases the probability to intend to vote for the
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Christian Democratic party in 2014. A possible explanation for this finding is that the party is
perceived by Flemish  voters  as  the  main  historical  incumbent  (Hooghe & Dassonneville,
2012).
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Figure 1. Average adjusted predictions of intending to vote for each of the parties by political trust (2014) – Flemish region
Source: Belgian Election Panel, BEP 2009-2014. Data are weighted by socio-demographics (gender, age and level of education).
Average adjusted predictions and 95%-confidence intervals based on the model in Appendix 1.
Next, we investigate the effect of political trust in 2014 on the vote intentions of Walloon
respondents. As we have done for the Flemish case as well, we estimate a multinomial logit
model and specify the Christian Democratic party (cdH) as the reference group. As there are
no real protest  parties among the French-speaking political  parties, we do not expect one
specific party to attract distrusting voters. The full results of this estimation are reported in
Appendix 2 and indicate that for the main parties (i.e., Greens, Liberals or Socialists) there are
no significant effects of political trust on the voters’ likelihood of voting for one of these
parties  rather  than choosing cdH, the reference category in  our  analyses.  We do observe,
however, that those who voted for the extreme-left party PTB-Go!, those who voted for one of
the  smaller  parties  (e.g.,  FDF and  FN)  or  those  who casted  a  blank  or  invalid  vote  are
significantly less trusting than those who intended to vote for cdH in 2014. 
To ease  the  interpretation  of  these  results,  in  Figure  2  we  present  the  average  adjusted
predictions of intending to vote for each of the parties by different levels of political trust.
While  the  effect  of  political  trust  to  vote  PTB  Go!,  another  small  party  or  to  cast  a
blank/invalid vote is clearly negative, confidence intervals are rather wide – which is due to
the  small  number  of  respondents  in  each  of  these  categories.  Furthermore,  plotting  the
estimated effect of political trust on vote intention clarifies that having a higher level of trust
in  politics  in  2014 is  significantly increasing  the  probability of  intending to  vote  for  the
socialist party PS. In line with the observation that high levels of political trust increased the
probability of voting CD&V in the Flemish region, we observe that in the Walloon region as
well  the  party  that  is  generally  and  historically  conceived  of  as  the  main  incumbent  is
attracting the most trusting voters (Dassonneville & Hooghe, 2012).
Figure 2. Average adjusted predictions of intending to vote for each of the parties by political trust (2014) – Walloon region
Source: Belgian Election Panel, BEP 2009-2014. Data are weighted by gender, age and level of education.
Average adjusted predictions and 95%-confidence intervals based on the model in Appendix 2.
The descriptive statistics for political trust in Table 1 already clarified that there was a decline
in levels of political trust between 2009 and 2014. In a next step, we assess how these changes
in trust levels between 2009 and 2014 affect what parties voters prefer. Therefore, we add to
the models presented in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 respondents’ evolution of political trust
between 2009 and 2014 (Δ political trust). This indicator takes a positive value if respondents
are becoming more trusting in politics between 2009 and 2014 and a negative value if their
level of trust in politics decreases. The predominant pattern among panel respondents is one
of  decreasing  levels  of  trust  in  politics.  For  the  Flemish  case  in  particular,  we can  also
introduce a distinction between trust in the regional institutions (with N-VA in the governing
coalition) and the federal institutions of Belgium (without N-VA in the governing coalition) as
this  allows us to observe whether the participation of N-VA in the regional governmental
coalition actually makes a difference for Flemish respondents.
The full results of these multinomial logistic regression analyses are presented in Appendix 3
(Flemish  region)  and Appendix  4 (Walloon region).  First,  for  the  Flemish  region,  results
indicate that besides respondents’ level of political trust, the evolution of this attitude as well
is correlated to vote intentions. As levels of trust increased between 2009 and 2014, panel
respondents became significantly less likely to intend voting for the N-VA, Vlaams Belang or
to cast a blank or invalid vote compared to voting for the Christian Democratic party CD&V.
We graphically present the estimated effect of Δ political trust on intending to vote for each of
the parties in Figure 3. The graphs clarify that similarly to what holds for levels of political
trust in the Flemish region as well, for change in trust-levels, effects are strongest for CD&V
on the one hand and N-VA on the other. First, as voters become more trusting between 2009
and 2014, this significantly increases their probability of voting for the Christian Democratic
party. The reverse is true for voting Vlaams Belang or casting a blank/invalid vote, although
these effects are only marginally significant. For the Flemish nationalist party, we observe that
improving trust levels significantly decrease the probability that respondents intend to vote N-
VA.
Figure 3. Average adjusted predictions of intending to vote for each of the parties by Δ political trust (2009-2014)
Source: Belgian Election Panel 2009-2014. Data are weighted by gender, age and level of education.
Average adjusted predictions and 95%-confidence intervals based on the model presented in Appendix 3
For the Walloon region as well, focusing on the evolution of political trust over the electoral
cycle results in similar conclusions. From the full results in Appendix 4 it can be observed that
there are no significant differences in the impact of Δ trust on choosing any of the main parties
over cdH. We note, however, that a higher Δ-value is significantly decreasing the probability
of  choosing  PTB  Go!,  another  party  or  of  casting  a  blank/invalid  voter  over  cdH.  The
graphical representation of these effects (Figure 4) illustrates that variations in Δ trust have
virtually no impact on the likelihood of voting cdH, Ecolo or MR, while we also note that
higher Δ values are significantly increasing the probability of voting for the PS. For choosing
the extreme-left PTB Go!, another small party or for casting a blank/invalid vote, finally, the
estimated effect of Δ trust is negative, but highly uncertain.
Figure 4. Average adjusted predictions of intending to vote for each of the parties by Δ political trust (2009-2014)
Source: Belgian Election Panel 2009-2014. Data are weighted by gender, age and level of education.
Average adjusted predictions and 95%-confidence intervals based on the model presented in Appendix 4.
Combined,  the  results  offer  support  for  our  second hypothesis:  protest  parties  succeed in
attracting voters who are becoming more distrustful. The analyses thus indicate that low levels
of political trust as well as a decline of trust increase the probability of voting for protest
parties. The contrast between the Flemish and Walloon region furthermore highlights the key
role played by protest parties: in Wallonia, where there are no clear protest parties running for
election, patterns of protest voting remain more diffuse.
In the Flemish region, the Flemish nationalist party N-VA in particular succeeds in attracting
voters who are becoming more distrusting over time. Since 2009, however, this party was part
of  the governing coalition  at  the  regional  level.4 Therefore  the N-VA could  no longer  be
considered a pure protest party at the regional level – in contrast to what holds at the federal
level, where the party was in opposition. As an additional test, we therefore investigate how
evolutions  in  regional  political  trust5 and  federal  political  trust6 respectively affect  voting
behaviour in the 2014 elections. The results of these analyses are presented in Appendix 5 and
Appendix 6 and indicate that for both levels of governance decreasing levels of political trust
significantly  increase  the  probability  of  choosing  N-VA,  Vlaams  Belang  or  casting  a
blank/invalid vote over choosing CD&V, confirming what we observed for a general sense of
political trust. Even though the estimated impact of decreasing levels of federal political trust
on choosing the N-VA is somewhat stronger compared to the effect of decreasing levels of
regional political trust – the status of the Flemish Nationalist party as an incumbent at the
regional  level  does  not  seem to  inhibit  it  from attracting  voters  who have become more
distrusting towards that specific level of government.
The question that remains is what subsequently happens to voters who have voted for a protest
party? Does voting for a protest party suffice as a way to channel dissatisfaction, as Miller and
Listhaug (1990) assume? Or do protest parties further ‘fuel’ distrust, as we hypothesized? We
first descriptively assess changes in levels of political trust between 2009 and 2014 for the
electorates of different parties. As evident from mean levels of change in political trust, on
average, voters have become less trusting in political institutions, with a decrease of about 0.5
among Flemish respondents and a 1-point decrease on the 0-10 trust scale among Walloon
4. The regional government in Flanders between 2009 and 2014 was a coalition between 
Christian Democrats, Nationalists and Socialists, with two Nationalist ministers (out of a total 
of nine). 
5 . A sum-scale of trust in the regional parliament and the regional government.
6 . A sum-scale of trust in the federal parliament and the federal government.
respondents.  Furthermore,  for  both  groups  levels  of  trust  in  the  regional  institutions
(parliament and government) have decreased somewhat more than levels of trust in the federal
institutions. In terms of the differences between parties, among the Dutch language parties,
we note the strongest decrease in levels of political trust  among those who voted Vlaams
Belang, N-VA or Open VLD in 2009. Table 2 also offers indications that N-VA voters are
distinguishing between different levels of government. Their decrease of trust at the regional
level – where the party was in the governing coalition – is less pronounced (-1.10) than what
holds for the federal level (-1.41), where the party still was in opposition. It is remarkable,
though, that having entered the regional coalition did not have a beneficial effect on the level
of trust of N-VA voters in that level of government. For the electorates of the French language
parties, levels of political trust have decreased in all groups, but quite markedly so among
those who voted for the socialist party in 2009.
Table 2. Δ political trust (2009-2014) by vote choice in the 2009 regional elections
Δ political trust Δ regional 
political trust
Δ federal 
political trust
CD&V -0.43 -0.66 -0.80
Groen -0.35 -1.16 -0.03
N-VA -0.73 -1.10 -1.41
SP.a -0.48 -0.90 -0.10
Vlaams Belang -0.79 -1.41 -1.12
Open VLD -0.71 -1.12 -0.84
Flemish respondents total -0.54 -0.90 -0.78
cdH -0.99 -1.08 -0.59
Ecolo -0.92 -0.94 -0.61
MR -0.92 -1.06 -0.50
PS -1.37 -1.69 -1.31
Walloon respondents total -1.03 -1.22 -0.76
Source: Belgian Election Panel 2009-2014. N Flemish respondents =500 and N Walloon respondents = 364.
Mean values are reported. Values for groups <20 are not shown.
While indicative, descriptive statistics are not sufficient for drawing strong conclusions on the
impact of having voted for a particular party. We therefore proceed with the estimation of
OLS regressions, explaining respondents’ change in political trust levels between 2009 and
2014.7 Besides the socio-demographic variables gender, age and level of education, we also
control for voters’ level of political trust in 2009, which takes into account potential ceiling
effects when investigating the evolution of trust over time. For assessing the impact of voting
7. The reliance on a panel design implies that the data suffer from attrition. As a way to 
account for this, we analysed the data weighted by vote choice as well. The results of these 
analyses are not substantially different from the results reported here. 
for  a  protest  party on  change  in  political  trust,  we  add a  series  of  dummy variables  on
respondents’ reported vote in 2009. For both language groups, we present three models, one
explaining  the  evolution  in  general  levels  of  political  trust,  a  second  model  focusing  on
regional institutions, and a third on federal institutions.
The results for the Dutch language parties are presented in Table 3. First, it has to be noted
that it is indeed important to control for the 2009 level of political trust, as the level of trust is
significantly related to the subsequent change in trust levels. Most importantly, the results
offer evidence for the thesis that protest parties are fuelling dissatisfaction. Respondents who
voted for  either  the Flemish nationalist  party N-VA or  for  Vlaams Belang in 2009 had a
significantly stronger decrease in trust between 2009 and 2014 compared to those who voted
CD&V in 2009. Additionally, even though the previous analyses indicated that lower levels of
trust as well as a strong decrease of political trust are significantly correlated to casting a
blank or invalid vote, the results in Table 3 do not indicate a similar ‘strengthening’ of distrust
for those voters as what holds for those who voted for a protest party. This offers support for
the causal mechanism suggested by Dinas (2014). When focusing on trust in the regional or
federal levels of government only, differences are minor and those who voted for N-VA and
Vlaams Belang in 2009 are consistently more distrusting over time. Focusing on having voted
N-VA in 2009, the effect is somewhat smaller for regional political trust than for federal trust,
but we note a significant decrease in both cases. The fact that among the 2009 N-VA voters,
the trust in the regional institutions (in which the N-VA participated) further declined, shows
an interesting dynamic. While Miller and Listhaug (1990) assumed that giving protest parties
a say in government could restore political trust among their supporters, the opposite seems to
occur, as protest parties ‘contaminate’ the level they participate in. The fact that we do not
observe all that much difference between Vlaams Belang and N-VA voters is highly relevant.
While the Vlaams Belang remained stuck in the opposition, the N-VA joined the coalition at
the regional level. Opposition or government, however, does not seem to have an effect on the
development  of  trust  levels  among their  supporters.  Both  groups  of  the  electorate  firmly
continue to display all the characteristics of a protest vote.
The results indicate that the N-VA effectively is associated with low levels of political trust.
Not only the party attracts voters with lower levels of political trust, it has also been found
that N-VA voters subsequently are more likely to develop even lower levels of political trust.
These findings are all the more remarkable, since in reality, during the 2010-2014 period, the
N-VA occupied  a  rather  ambiguous  position  in  the  Belgian  federal  system,  by  being  in
opposition on the federal level, while joining the governing coalition on the regional level. It
falls  outside  the  scope  of  the  current  article  to  explain  this  finding,  but  two  potential
explanations come to mind. First, it is possible that Belgian voters consider the federal level to
be the most important level of government, with as a result that the N-VA for them was first of
all an opposition party. A second possibility is that the party itself stressed in its campaign
rhetoric its opposition to the federal government, while it downplayed its accomplishments
within the regional government. Further research is needed to assess which explanation is
most plausible. 
For voters in Wallonia, the descriptive results in Table 2 indicated that especially those who
voted for the PS in 2009 became more distrusting over the 2009-2014 electoral cycle. In Table
4,  we assess  whether  a  vote for  the  socialist  (or  any other  electoral  choice  in  2009) has
significantly affected the subsequent evolution of political trust in general, regional political
trust or federal political trust. Unlike what we observed for Flemish respondents, none of the
2009-vote options significantly affects the evolution of respondents’ attitudes of political trust
over time. In the Walloon electoral context – a  context  that  is  marked by the absence of
clearly identifiable  protest  parties  –  we find no evidence  that  particular  parties  would be
fueling political distrust. 
Table 3. Explaining Δ political trust (2009-2014)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Political trust Regional trust Federal trust
b
(s.e.)
b
(s.e.)
b
(s.e.)
Political trust 2009 -0.513***
(0.068)
Regional political trust 2009 -0.538***
(0.065)
Federal political trust 2009 -0.607***
(0.069)
Female (ref: male) 0.031 0.006 0.123
(0.163) (0.183) (0.184)
Age 0.001 -0.001 0.002
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Lower educated (ref: middle) -0.689* -0.514 -0.714*
(0.272) (0.299) (0.294)
Higher educated (ref: middle) 0.366* 0.259 0.400*
(0.160) (0.182) (0.184)
Party voted for 2009 (ref: CD&V)
Groen -0.318 -0.840* 0.326
(0.283) (0.332) (0.344)
N-VA -0.781*** -0.687** -1.121***
(0.229) (0.257) (0.265)
SP.a -0.203 -0.519 0.397
(0.285) (0.316) (0.320)
Vlaams Belang -1.146** -1.531*** -1.093*
(0.405) (0.433) (0.427)
Open VLD -0.391 -0.645* -0.127
(0.289) (0.301) (0.326)
Lijst Dedecker -0.721 -0.490 -1.163*
(0.518) (0.597) (0.511)
Other 0.171 -0.262 0.744
(0.431) (0.537) (0.487)
Blank/invalid -1.182 -1.752 -0.262
(0.631) (0.908) (0.621)
Constant 2.579*** 3.045*** 2.823***
(0.583) (0.640) (0.615)
N 404 422 412
R2 0.196 0.211 0.265
Source: Belgian Election Panel 2009-2014. Data weighted by socio-demographics (gender, age and level of 
education). Unstandardized regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Significance: * p < 0.05, ** p 
< 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table 4. Explaining Δ political trust (2009-2014)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Political trust Regional trust Federal trust
b
(s.e.)
b
(s.e.)
b
(s.e.)
Political trust 2009 -0.353***
(0.067)
Regional political trust 2009 -0.490***
(0.071)
Federal political trust 2009 -0.419***
(0.069)
Female (ref: male) -0.041 -0.023 -0.342
(0.230) (0.257) (0.247)
Age 0.006 0.007 0.015
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Lower educated (ref: middle) 0.068 -0.027 0.208
(0.326) (0.366) (0.347)
Higher educated (ref: middle) 0.453 0.169 0.482
(0.248) (0.281) (0.275)
Party voted for 2009 (ref: cdH)
Ecolo -0.126 -0.094 -0.301
(0.337) (0.405) (0.359)
MR -0.178 -0.401 -0.310
(0.303) (0.390) (0.347)
PS -0.269 -0.251 -0.487
(0.358) (0.436) (0.374)
Other -0.324 -1.113 -0.086
(0.780) (0.943) (0.937)
Blank/invalid -0.706 -0.937 -0.955
(0.534) (0.676) (0.712)
Constant 0.471 1.168 0.971
(0.585) (0.677) (0.625)
N 273 290 285
R2 0.110 0.157 0.168
Source: Belgian Election Panel 2009-2014. Data weighted by socio-demographics (gender, age and level of 
education). Unstandardized regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Significance: * p < 0.05, ** p <
0.01, *** p < 0.001.
5.DISCUSSION
Confirming previous research, we find that low levels of political trust are associated with a
preference  for  a  protest  party.  Furthermore,  becoming  more  distrustful  in  between  two
elections as well increases the probability of voting for a protest party. As levels of political
trust are deteriorating, protest parties not only electorally benefit from the fact that the pool of
low trusting voters is growing, the voters who are becoming less trusting are also more likely
to vote for protest parties. If we want to understand how attitudes as political trust  affect
political  behaviour, it  is  hence important  not  only to  look at  levels  but  also to  take  into
account changing attitudes. Longer panel data could shed light on fluctuations over a more
extended period of time and provide insights in what happens if respondents vote for an anti-
establishment party for a longer period of time. Interestingly, whether the protest party joins a
government coalition (N-VA) or not (Vlaams Belang), does not seem to change this fuelling
effect.  For  mainstream parties  it  is  therefore  not  clear  at  all  how  they  can  react  to  the
challenge of protest parties. Following a ‘damned if you do, damned if you don’t’ logic, both
ignoring and incorporating protest parties seem to have exactly the same effect
Our findings hint at a ‘spiral of distrust’.8 Low levels of trust as well as decreasing levels of
political trust increase the probability of voting for a protest party. Having chosen such a party
subsequently acts to decrease one’s level of trust in politics even further. The result is a spiral
of distrust, where distrust and protest voting enforce each other. Miller and Listhaug (1990)
were quite optimistic on how flexible party systems would allow protest parties to rise. Such
parties,  according  to  Miller  and  Listhaug,  could  channel  dissatisfaction  and  stop  the
accumulation of discontent. What we observe in the Belgian multiparty system, is more in
line with what van der Brug suggested to hold in the Netherlands; protest parties can ‘fuel’
discontent and this discontent even rises further when the protest party is integrated in the
8. This concept is of course derived from the seminal concept of a ‘spiral of silence’, coined 
by Noelle-Neumann (1982). 
governing coalition. In line with the argument by Dinas, casting a protest vote apparently
leads  to  the  consolidation  of  a  specific  political  identity,  and  voters  further  develop  the
attitudes that are congruent with their party preference. The key role that protest parties play
in this ‘spiral of distrust’ is evident from the contrast between voting behaviour in the Flemish
and Walloon regions of Belgium. Among Flemish voters, those who voted for protest parties
are becoming significantly less trusting over time. In the French language party system, that is
marked by the absence of a clear protest party, we do not observe a pattern in which having
voted for a particular party leads voters to become even less trusting over time. 
Obviously, this  study comes with a number of important limitations. First,  the analysis  is
restricted to one particular case: the Belgian electoral context in the 2009-2014 period. Future
research should hence clarify whether our observations can be generalized more broadly, and
to political systems without compulsory voting. The fact however, that for List Pim Fortuyn in
the Netherlands as well previous research has pointed out a pattern of ‘fuelling’ discontent,
suggests that what we observe is not a particularity of Belgian electoral politics. Second, it has
to be remembered that we only have data for one electoral cycle of five years. It is possible
that this  is not sufficient as an observation period to document the transformation from a
protest party toward a ‘party in government’. For convincingly showing the presence of a
‘spiral of distrust’ we would ideally make use of a panel study that covers a more extended
period of time. Third, the use of panel data also comes with disadvantages, of which panel-
attrition is an essential one. Four, our results point out that those who voted for a protest party
subsequently  become  more  distrusting,  but  we  can  only  speculate  about  the  mechanism
causing  this  pattern.  More  research,  linking  individual-level  data  with  data  on  campaign
coverage, is needed to enhance our knowledge of whether and how parties actively contribute
to the spiral of distrust. Better insight in the exact causal mechanisms determining the spiral
of distrust might also provide more specific suggestions on how the spiral could be reversed.
REFERENCES
Arzheimer, K. (2009). Contextual Factors and the Extreme Right Vote in Western Europe, 
1980-2002. American Journal of Political Science, 53(2), 259–275.
Bélanger, É., & Aarts, K. (2006). Explaining the Rise of the LPF: Issues, Discontent, and the 
2002 Dutch Election. Acta Politica, 41(1), 4–20.
Bélanger, É., & Nadeau, R. (2005). Political Trust and the Vote in Multiparty Elections: The 
Canadian Case. European Journal of Political Research, 44(1), 121–146.
Boonen, J. & Hooghe, M. (2014). Do Nationalist Parties Shape or Follow Sub-national 
Identities? A Panel Analysis on the Rise of the Nationalist Party in Flanders (Belgium), 
2006-2011. Nations and Nationalism, 20(1), 56-79.
Citrin, J. (1974). The Political Relevance of Trust in Government. American Political Science
Review, 68(3), 973–988.
Dandoy, R. (2014). The Impact of Government Participation and Prospects on Party Policy 
Preferences in Belgium. Government and Opposition, 49(4), 630-657. 
Dassonneville, R., Falk Pedersen, E., Grieb, A. & Hooghe, M. (2014). Belgian Election Panel
2009-2014. Technical Report. Leuven: University of Leuven.
Dassonneville, R. & Hooghe, M. (2012). Election Forecasting under Opaque Conditions: A 
Model for Francophone Belgium, 1981-2010. International Journal of Forecasting 28(4):
777-788.
Deschouwer, K., & Reuchamps, M. (2013). The Belgian Federation at a Crossroad. Regional 
and Federal Studies, 23(3), 261–270.
Deschouwer, K., Delwit, P., Hooghe, M., Baudewyns, P. & Walgrave, S. (eds., 2015), 
Décrypter l'électeur. Le comportement électoral et les motivations de vote. Louvain: 
Lannoo.
Dinas, E. (2014). Does Choice Bring Loyalty? Electoral Participation and the Development of
Party Identification. American Journal of Political Science, 25(2), 449–465.
Fiorina, M. P. (1978). Economic Retrospective Voting in American National Elections: A 
Micro-Analysis. American Journal of Political Science, 22(2), 426–443.
Frankel, L.L. & Hillygus, D.S. (2013). Lookig Beyond Demographics: Panel Attrition in the 
ANES and GSS. Political Analysis, 22(3): 363-353.
Gabriel, O. (2015). When Representation Fails. Behavioural Reactions to Perceived Failure of
Political Representation in France and Germany, in T.Poguntke, S. Roßteutscher, R. 
Schmitt-Beck & S. Zmerli (eds.), Citizenship and Democracy in an Era of Crisis. 
London: Routledge.
Hetherington, M. J. (1998). The Political Relevance of Political Trust. American Political 
Science Review, 92(4), 791–808.
Hetherington, M. J. (1999). The Effect of Political Trust on the Presidential Vote, 1968-1996. 
American Political Science Review, 93(2), 311-326.
Hooghe, M. (2012). The Political Crisis in Belgium (2007-2011): A Federal System without 
Federal Loyalty. Representation, 48(1), 131–138.
Hooghe, M., & Dassonneville, R. (2014). Party Members as an Electoral Linking Mechanism.
An Election Forecasting Model for Political Parties in Belgium, 1981-2010. Party 
Politics, 20(3), 368–380.
Hooghe, M., Jacobs, L. & Claes, E. (2015). Enduring Gender Bias in Reporting on Political 
Elite Positions. Media Coverage of Female MPs in Belgian News Broadcasts (2003-
2011). International Journal of Press/Politics,20(4), 395-414.
Hooghe, M., Marien, S., & Pauwels, T. (2011). Where Do Distrusting Voters Turn if There is 
No Viable Exit or Voice Option ? The Impact of Political Trust on Electoral Behaviour in 
the Belgian Regional Elections of June 2009. Government and Opposition, 46(2), 245–
273.
Ivarsflaten, E. (2007). What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe?: Re-Examining 
Grievance Mobilization Models in Seven Successful Cases. Comparative Political 
Studies, 41(1), 3–23.
Lewis-Beck, M. S., & Stegmaier, M. (2013). The VP-Function Revisited: A Survey of the 
Literature on Vote and Popularity Functions after over 40 Years. Public Choice, 157(3-4),
367–385.
McAllister, I. (1982). The Australian democrats: Protest vote or portent of realignment? 
Politics, 17(1), 68-73.
Marien, S. (2011). Measuring Political Trust across Time and Space. In S. Zmerli & M. 
Hooghe (Eds.), Political Trust. Why Context Matters (pp. 13–46). Colchester: ECPR 
Press.
Miller, A. H., & Listhaug, O. (1990). Political Parties and Confidence in Government: A 
Comparison of Norway, Sweden and the United States. British Journal of Political 
Science, 20(3), 357–386.
Mudde, C. (2007). Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge 
University Press.
Noelle-Neumann, E. (1982). Die Schweigespirale. Öffentliche Meinung, unsere soziale Haut. 
Frankfurt: Ullstein.
Norris, P. (Ed.). (1999). Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pauwels, T. (2011). Explaining the Strange Decline of the Populist Radical Right Vlaams 
Belang in Belgium. The impact of permanent opposition. Acta Politica, 46(1), 60-82.
Rabinowitz, G., & Macdonald, S. E. (1989). A Directional theory of Issue Voting. American 
Political Science Review, 83(1), 93–121.
Rooduijn, M., S. de Lange & W. van der Brug (2014). A Populist Zeitgeist? Programmatic 
Contagion by Populist Parties in Western Europe. Party Politics, 20(4), 563-575.
Schumacher, G., & Rooduijn, M. (2013). Sympathy for the “Devil”? Voting for Populists in 
the 2006 and 2010 Dutch General Elections. Electoral Studies, 32(1), 124–133.
Thijssen, P. (2001). Extreem-rechts en politieke aliënatie: een causaal mysterie? Case-study: 
Het Vlaams Blok. Tijdschrift voor Sociologie, 22(3): 243-273.
Vandecasteele, L. & Debels, A. (2007). Attrition in Panel Data: The Effectiveness of 
Weighting. European Sociological Review, 23(1): 81-97.
Van der Brug, W. (2003). How the LPF Fuelled Discontent: Empirical Tests of Explanations 
of LPF Support. Acta Politica, 38(1), 89–106.
Van der Brug, W. & Fennema, M. (2003). Protest or mainstream? How the European anti-
immigrant parties developed into two separate groups by 1999. European Journal of 
Political Research, 42(1), 55-76.
Van der Brug, W., Fennema, M. & Tillie, J. (2000). Anti-immigrant parties in Europe: 
Ideological or Protest Vote? European Journal of Political Research, 37(1), 77-102.
Van der Eijk, C. & Niemöller, B. (2008). Recall Accuracy and its Determinants. In: K. 
Arzheimer & J. Evans (eds.) Electoral Behavior. Volume 4: Debates and Methodology. 
Los Angeles: Sage (pp. 232-280).
Van Kessel, S. (2011). Explaining the Electoral Performance of Populist Parties: The 
Netherlands as a Case Study. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 12(1), 68–
88.
Van Spanje, J. (2011). The Wrong and the Right: A Comparative Analysis of ‘Anti-
Immigration’ and ‘Far Right’ Parties. Government and Opposition, 46(3), 293-320.

